A Truthful Randomized Mechanism for Combinatorial Public Projects via
  Convex Optimization by Dughmi, Shaddin
ar
X
iv
:1
10
3.
00
41
v2
  [
cs
.G
T]
  1
6 A
pr
 20
11
A Truthful Randomized Mechanism for Combinatorial Public
Projects via Convex Optimization∗
Shaddin Dughmi†
Department of Computer Science
Stanford University
shaddin@cs.stanford.edu
October 29, 2018
Abstract
In Combinatorial Public Projects, there is a set of projects that may be undertaken, and a set of self-
interested players with a stake in the set of projects chosen. A public planner must choose a subset of
these projects, subject to a resource constraint, with the goal of maximizing social welfare. Combinato-
rial Public Projects has emerged as one of the paradigmatic problems in Algorithmic Mechanism Design,
a field concerned with solving fundamental resource allocation problems in the presence of both selfish
behavior and the computational constraint of polynomial-time.
We design a polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation, (1− 1/e)-approximation mechanism for wel-
fare maximization in a fundamental variant of combinatorial public projects. Our results apply to com-
binatorial public projects when players have valuations that are matroid rank sums (MRS), which en-
compass most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context, including coverage
functions, matroid weighted-rank functions, and convex combinations thereof. Our approximation fac-
tor is the best possible, assuming P 6= NP . Ours is the first mechanism that achieves a constant factor
approximation for a natural NP-hard variant of combinatorial public projects.
∗Extended abstract appears in Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), 2011.
†Supported by NSF Grant CCF-0448664.
1 Introduction
The overarching goal of algorithmic mechanism design is to design computationally efficient algorithms
that solve or approximate fundamental resource allocation problems in which the underlying data is a priori
unknown to the algorithm. A problem that has received much attention in this context — albeit mostly in
the form of negative results — is Combinatorial Public Projects (CPP). Here, there are m projects being
considered by a public planner, n players, and a bound k ≤ m on the number of projects that may be chosen.
Each player i has a private valuation vi(S) for each subset S of the projects. We consider the flexible variant
of CPP, where a feasible solution is a set of at most k projects1. The goal is to choose a feasible set of
projects S maximizing social welfare: ∑i vi(S). The valuations are initially unknown to the public planner,
and must be elicited from the (self-interested) players. A “mechanism” for CPP extracts this information,
and decides on a set of projects to undertake. The mechanisms we consider can charge the players payments
in order to incentivize truthful reporting of their valuations. Moreover, we seek mechanisms that run in
polynomial time.
Since CPP is highly inapproximable for general valuations — even by non-truthful algorithms — it is
most interesting to study CPP for restricted classes of valuations. Most notable among these are submodular
valuations, as they naturally model the pervasive notion of “diminishing marginal returns”. In this paper,
we study CPP for a fundamental and large subset of submodular valuations: Matroid Rank Sum Valuations.
This class includes most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context. Most notably,
it includes the canonical and arguably most natural example of submodularity: coverage functions.
Combinatorial public projects and its variants are examples of welfare maximization problems. There are
many other examples, most notable among them are combinatorial auctions, with their many variants (see
e.g. [25]). Welfare maximization problems occupy a central position in mechanism design, not only because
of the fundamental nature of the utilitarian objective, but also due to the rich economic theory surrounding
them. Most notably, the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (see e.g. [25]) is a general
solution for all these problems, at least from an economic perspective. The VCG mechanism is truthful, in
that it is in a player’s best interest to report his true valuations regardless of the reports of the other players.
Moreover, VCG finds the welfare maximizing solution.
Unfortunately, however, most interesting welfare maximization problems, such as combinatorial public
projects, are NP-hard. Therefore, implementing VCG efficiently — i.e. in polynomial time — is impossible
unless P = NP . Moreover, as first argued in [24], most existing approximation algorithms — unlike
exact algorithms — cannot be converted to truthful mechanisms by the imposition of a suitable payment
scheme. This necessitates the design of carefully crafted approximation algorithms, tailored specifically
for truthfulness. Understanding the power of these truthful approximation mechanisms is the central goal
of algorithmic mechanism design. This research agenda was first advocated by Nisan and Ronen [23].
Since then, combinatorial auctions and combinatorial public projects have emerged as the paradigmatic
“challenge-problems” of the field, with much work in recent years establishing upper and lower-bounds on
truthful polynomial-time mechanisms for these problems, for example: [20, 11, 13, 12, 10, 6, 14, 27, 3, 4,
7, 17].
The “holy grail” of algorithmic mechanism design is to design polynomial-time truthful approximation
mechanisms that match the approximation guarantee of the best (non-truthful) polynomial-time approxima-
tion algorithm. Unfortunately, several recent impossibility results have shed serious doubt on the possibility
1This is in contrast to the exact variant, where each feasible solution consists of exactly k projects — a difference that is
uninteresting in an approximation algorithms context, yet has major implications when incentives are in the picture. For more on
the distinction between the two variants, we refer the reader to [7].
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of this goal [10, 27, 3, 4, 7]. Combinatorial public projects, in particular, bore the brunt of the most bru-
tal of these negative results [27, 4, 7]. Fortunately, all but one of these lower bounds apply exclusively to
deterministic mechanisms, and none apply to randomized mechanisms for the — arguably more natural —
flexible variant of combinatorial public projects.
As the limitations of deterministic mechanisms became apparent, a recent research direction has focused
on designing randomized approximation mechanisms for the fundamental problems of algorithmic mecha-
nism design [20, 8, 15, 9, 17]. These mechanisms are instances of the only general approach2 known for
designing (randomized) truthful mechanisms: via maximal-in-distributional range (MIDR) algorithms [8].
An MIDR algorithm fixes a set of distributions over feasible solutions — the distributional range — inde-
pendently of the valuations reported by the self-interested participants, and outputs a random sample from
the distribution that maximizes expected (reported) welfare. The “Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)” payment
scheme renders an MIDR algorithm truthful-in-expectation — that is, a player unaware of the coin flips of
the mechanism maximizes his expected utility by reporting truthfully.
Recently Dughmi, Roughgarden and Yan [17] presented the most general framework to date for the
design of maximal-in-distributional-range algorithms. Their approach is based on convex optimization, and
generalizes the celebrated linear-programming based approach of Lavi and Swamy [20]. Given a mathemat-
ical relaxation to a welfare maximization problem, [17] advocates designing randomized rounding schemes
that are convex. Given a convex rounding scheme, the problem of finding the best output of the rounding
scheme is a convex optimization problem solvable in polynomial time, and implements an MIDR allocation
rule. They then show how to design a convex rounding scheme for combinatorial auctions with matroid rank
sum valuations, yielding an optimal (1 − 1/e) approximation mechanism. We elaborate on the framework
of [17] in Section 2.5.
By reducing the problem of designing a truthful mechanism to that of designing a convex rounding
scheme, the approach of [17] yielded the first optimal truthful mechanism for a variant of combinatorial
auctions with restricted valuations. It is now natural to wonder if their approach is applicable to other
welfare maximization problems. In particular, can the convex rounding framework be used to obtain optimal
approximation mechanisms for interesting variants of Combinatorial Public Projects?
We answer this question in the affirmative, and elaborate on our contributions below.
1.1 Contributions
We design a (1−1/e)-approximate convex rounding scheme for combinatorial public projects with matroid
rank sum valuations. This yields a (1 − 1/e)-approximate truthful-in-expectation mechanism for CPP,
running in expected polynomial-time. This is the best approximation possible for this problem, even without
truthfulness, unless P = NP . Therefore, ours is the first truthful mechanism for an NP-hard variant of CPP
that matches the approximation ratio of the best non-truthful algorithm. Our results works with “black-box”
valuations, provided that players can answer a randomized analogue of value oracles.
To prove our results, we follow the general outline of [17]. However, our task is more challenging:
whereas in combinatorial auctions, randomized rounding may allocate each item independently (the ap-
proach taken in [17]), this is not possible in CPP. We must respect the cardinality constraint of k on the set
of chosen projects, and therefore our rounding scheme must by fiat be dependent. This presents a major
challenge in analyzing our rounding scheme. Whereas the expected value of a submodular function on a
product distribution (i.e. independent rounding) has been studied extensively, and is closely related to the
2The random sampling approach used in [6], while arguably general, does not seem applicable beyond auction settings — in
particular, it is not applicable to combinatorial public projects.
2
now well-understood multi-linear (see e.g. [5, 30]), analyzing the expected value of a dependent distribution
— in particular proving it to be a concave function of underlying parameters — is a technical challenge that
we overcome by combining techniques from combinatorics, convex analysis, and matroid theory.
1.2 Additional Related Work
Combinatorial Public Projects, in particular its exact variant, was first introduced by Papadimitriou, Schapira
and Singer [27]. They show that no deterministic truthful mechanism for exact CPP with submodular val-
uations can guarantee better than a O(
√
m) approximation to the optimal social welfare. The non-strategic
version of the problem, on the other hand, is equivalent to maximizing a submodular function subject to
a cardinality constraint, and admits a (1 − 1/e)-approximation algorithm due to Nemhauser, Wolsey and
Fisher [21], and this is optimal [28] assuming P 6= NP .
Buchfuhrer, Schapira and Singer [4] explored approximation algorithms and truthful mechanisms for
CPP with various classes of valuations in the submodular hierarchy. The most relevant result of [4] to our
paper is a lower-bound of O(
√
m) on deterministic truthful mechanisms for the exact variant of CPP with
coverage valuations — a class of valuations for which our randomized mechanism for flexible CPP obtains
a (1− 1/e) approximation.
Most recently, Dobzinski [7] showed two lower bounds for CPP in the value oracle model: A lower
bound of O(
√
m) on universally truthful mechanisms for flexible CPP with submodular valuations, and a
lower bound of O(
√
m) on truthful-in-expectation mechanisms for exact CPP with submodular valuations.
We note that the latter was the first unconditional lower bound on truthful-in-expectation mechanisms.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Combinatorial Public Projects
In Combinatorial Public Projects there is a set [m] = {1, . . . ,m} of projects, a cardinality bound k such that
0 ≤ k ≤ m, and a set [n] = {1, . . . , n} of players. Each player i has a valuation function vi : 2[m] → R+
that is normalized (vi(∅) = 0) and monotone (vi(A) ≤ vi(B) whenever A ⊆ B). In this paper, we
consider the flexible variant of combinatorial public projects: a feasible solution is a set S ⊆ [m] of projects
with |S| ≤ k. Player i’s value for outcome S is equal to vi(S). The goal is to choose the feasible set S
maximizing social welfare: ∑i vi(S).
We consider Combinatorial Public Projects where each player’s valuation vi is know to lie in some set
V of valuation functions. We abbreviate the set of instances of CPP constrained to valuations V as CPP(V).
As first defined in [27], CPP was considered with V equal to the set of monotone submodular functions.
In this paper, we focus on CPP with matroid-rank-sum (MRS) valuations — a large subset of monotone
submodular functions.
2.2 Mechanism Design Basics
We consider direct-revelation mechanisms for combinatorial public projects. Fix m,n, and k, and let S =
{S ⊆ [m] : |S| ≤ k} denote the set of feasible solutions. A mechanism comprises an allocation rule, which
is a function from (hopefully truthfully) reported valuation functions v1, . . . , vn : 2[m] → R to a feasible
outcome S ∈ S , and a payment rule, which is a function from reported valuation functions to a required
payment from each player. We allow the allocation and payment rules to be randomized.
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A mechanism with allocation and payment rulesA and p is truthful-in-expectation if every player always
maximizes its expected payoff by truthfully reporting its valuation function, meaning that
E[vi(A(v))− pi(v)] ≥ E[vi(A(v′i, v−i))− pi(v′i, v−i)] (1)
for every player i, (true) valuation function vi, (reported) valuation function v′i, and (reported) valuation
functions v−i of the other players. The expectation in (1) is over the coin flips of the mechanism.
The mechanisms that we design can be thought of as randomized variations on the classical VCG mecha-
nism, as we explain next. Recall that the VCG mechanism is defined by the (generally intractable) allocation
rule that selects the welfare-maximizing outcome with respect to the reported valuation functions, and the
payment rule that charges each player i a bid-independent “pivot term” minus the reported welfare earned
by other players in the selected outcome. This (deterministic) mechanism is truthful; see e.g. [22].
Now let dist(S) denote the probability distributions over the feasible set S , and let D ⊆ dist(S) be a
compact subset of them. The corresponding Maximal-In-Distributional-Range (MIDR) allocation rule is de-
fined as follows: given reported valuation functions v1, . . . , vn, return an outcome that is sampled randomly
from a distribution D∗ ∈ D that maximizes the expected welfare ES∼D[
∑
i vi(S)] over all distributions
D ∈ D. Analogous to the VCG mechanism, there is a (randomized) payment rule that can be coupled with
this allocation rule to yield a truthful-in-expectation mechanism (see [8]).
2.3 Matroid Rank Sum Valuations
We now define matroid rank sum valuations. Relevant concepts from matroid theory are reviewed in Ap-
pendix B.1.
Definition 2.1. A set function v : 2[m] → R is a matroid rank sum (MRS) function if there exists a family
of matroid rank functions u1, . . . , uκ : 2[m] → R, and associated non-negative weights w1, . . . , wκ ∈ R+,
such that v(S) =
∑κ
ℓ=1 wℓuℓ(S) for all S ⊆ [m].
We do not assume any particular representation of MRS functions, and require only oracle access to their
(expected) values on certain distributions (see Section 2.4). MRS valuations include most concrete examples
of monotone submodular functions that appear in the literature — this includes coverage functions3, matroid
weighted-rank functions4 , and all convex combinations thereof. Moreover, as shown in [28], 1− 1/e is the
best approximation possible for CPP with coverage valuations — and hence also for MRS valuations —
in polynomial time, even ignoring strategic considerations. That being said, we note that some interesting
submodular functions — such as some budget additive functions5 — are not in the matroid rank sum family.
2.4 Lotteries and Oracles
A value oracle for a valuation v : 2[m] → R takes as input a set S ⊆ [m], and returns v(S). We define an
analogous oracle that takes in a description of a simple lottery over sets S ⊆ [m], and outputs the expectation
of v over this lottery.
3A coverage function f on ground set [m] designates some setY , and m subsets A1, . . . , Am ⊆ Y , such that f(S) = |∪ℓ∈SAℓ|.
We note that Y may be an infinite, yet measurable, space. Coverage functions are arguably the canonical example of a submodular
function.
4This is a generalization of matroid rank functions, where weights are placed on elements of the matroid. It is true, though not
immediately obvious, that a matroid weighted-rank function can be expressed as a weighted combination of matroid (unweighted)
rank functions — see e.g. [16].
5 A set function f on ground set [m] is budgeted additive if there exists a constant B ≥ 0 (the budget) such that f(S) =
min(B,
∑
j∈S
f({j})).
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Let k ∈ [m], let R ⊆ [m], and let x ∈ [0, 1]m be a vector such that ∑j xj ≤ 1. We interpret x as
a probability distribution over [m] ∪ {∗}, where ∗ represents not choosing a project. Specifically, project
j ∈ [m] is chosen with probability xj , and ∗ is chosen with probability 1−
∑
j xj . We define a distribution
DRk (x) over 2
[m]
, and call this distribution the k-bounded lottery with marginals x and promise R. We
sample S ∼ DRk (x) as follows: Let j1, . . . , jk be independent draws from x, and let S = R∪{j1, . . . , jk} \
{∗}. Essentially, this lottery commits to choosing projects R, and adds an additional k projects chosen
randomly with replacement from distribution x. When R = ∅, as will be the case through most of this
paper, we omit mention of the promised set. We can now define a randomized analogue of a value oracle
that returns the expected value of a bounded-lottery.
Definition 2.2. A bounded-lottery-value oracle for set function v : 2[m] → R takes as input a vector
x ∈ [0, 1]m with ∑j xj ≤ 1, a bound k ∈ [m], and a set R ⊆ [m], and outputs ES∼DRk (x)[v(S)].
In our model for CPP, we assume that a player with valuation function vi can answer bounded-lottery-
value oracle queries for vi. A bounded-lottery-value oracle is a generalization of value oracles. Nevertheless,
it is the case that a bounded-lottery-value oracle can be implemented using a value oracle for some succinctly
represented examples of MRS valuations, such as explicit coverage functions (In similar fashion to [17,
Appendix A]).
More generally we note that bounded-lottery-value oracles can be approximated arbitrarily well, with
high probability, using value oracles; this is done by random sampling, and we omit the technical details.
Unfortunately, we are not able to reconcile the incurred sampling errors — small as they may be — with
the requirement that our mechanism be exactly truthful. We suspect that relaxing our solution concept to
approximate truthfulness – also known as ǫ-truthfulness – would remove this difficulty, and allow us to relax
our oracle model to the more traditional value oracles.
2.5 Convex Rounding
In this section, we review convex rounding, a framework for the design of truthful mechanisms introduced
by Dughmi, Roughgarden and Yan [17]. We present the main definitions and lemmas as they pertain to
combinatorial public projects. For a more thorough and general treatment of convex rounding, we refer the
reader to [17, Section 3].
We consider the standard integer programming formulation of CPP. There is a variable xj ∈ {0, 1}
for each project j ∈ [m], and the goal is to set at most k of the variables to 1 so that the welfare v(x) =∑
i vi({j : xj = 1}) is maximized. We relax this integer program in the obvious way to the polytope P ={
x ∈ Rm :∑j xj ≤ k, x  0}. We postulate a rounding scheme r that maps points of P to the feasible
solutions S = {S ⊆ [m] : |S| ≤ k} of CPP. We allow r to be randomized, so that r(x) is a distribution over
S for each x ∈ P.
Traditionally, approximation algorithms optimize an objective v˜(x) — often a simple extension of v to
P — over the set P of fractional solutions, and then round the optimal fractional point x∗ to a solution r(x∗)
in the original feasible set S . Many of the best approximation algorithms for various problems are based
on this relax-solve-round framework. Unfortunately, however, this approach is almost always incompatible
with the design of truthful mechanisms, due to the fact that the rounding step is often unpredictable. Truthful
mechanism design, on the other hand, is intimately tied to exact optimization, as evidenced by the fact that
the vast majority truthful mechanisms for multi-parameter problems are based on the VCG paradigm (see
Section 2.2).
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In an effort to reconcile the techniques of approximation algorithms and truthful mechanism design,
Dughmi, Roughgarden and Yan proposed optimizing directly on the output of the rounding scheme, rather
than on its input. This defines an optimization problem induced by relaxation P and rounding scheme r.
Stated for CPP with the relaxation as described above, the problem is as follows.
maximize ES∼r(x)[
∑
i vi(S)]
subject to ∑mj=1 xj ≤ k
0 ≤ xj ≤ 1, for j = 1, . . . ,m.
(2)
They consider a simple allocation rule, which we state for CPP in Algorithm 1, that solves (2) optimally.
They observe that this allocation rule is maximal-in-distributional-range.
Algorithm 1 MIDR Allocation Rule for CPP
Parameter: n,m,k
Parameter: (Randomized) rounding scheme r
Input: Valuation functions {vi}ni=1
Output: A set S ⊆ [m] with |S| ≤ k
1: Let x∗ be an optimal solution to (2)
2: Let S ∼ r(x∗)
Lemma 2.3 ([17]). Algorithm 1 is an MIDR allocation rule.
For α ≤ 1, we say that the rounding scheme r for CPP(V) is α-approximate if, whenever x is an integer
point of P corresponding to a set S ∈ S , and vi ∈ V for each i, we have that ET∼r(x)[
∑
i vi(T )] ≥
α
∑
i vi(S). In other words, rounding does not degrade the quality of an integer solution by more than α.
Given the definition of Algorithm 1, it is easy to conclude the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4 ([17]). If r is an α-approximate rounding scheme for CPP(V), then Algorithm 1 is an α-
approximation algorithm for CPP(V).
For reasons outlined in [17], implementing Algorithm 1 efficiently is impossible for most rounding
schemes r in the literature. To get around this difficulty, they advocate designing rounding schemes that
render (2) a convex optimization problem.
Definition 2.5. Consider a randomized rounding scheme r : P → dist(S). We say r is a convex rounding
scheme for CPP(V) if, whenever vi ∈ V for all i, the objective ES∼r(x)[
∑
i vi(S)] is a concave function of
x.
Lemma 2.6. When r is a convex rounding scheme for CPP(V) , (2) is a convex optimization problem for
each instance of CPP(V).
Under additional technical conditions, discussed in the context of combinatorial public projects in Ap-
pendix A, convex program (2) can be solved efficiently (e.g., using the ellipsoid method). This reduces the
design of a polynomial-time α-approximate MIDR algorithm to designing a polynomial-time α-approximate
convex rounding scheme.
Summarizing, Lemmas 2.3, 2.4, and 2.6 give the following informal theorem.
Theorem 2.7 (Informal). If there exists an α-approximate convex rounding scheme for CPP(V), then there
exists a truthful-in-expectation, polynomial-time, α-approximate mechanism for CPP(V).
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3 The Mechanism
In this section, we prove the main result.
Theorem 3.1. There is a (1−1/e)-approximate, truthful-in-expectation mechanism for combinatorial public
projects with matroid rank sum valuations in the bounded-lottery-value oracle model, running in expected
poly(n,m) time.
We structure the proof of Theorem 3.1 as follows. We define the k-bounded-lottery rounding scheme,
which we denote by rk, in Section 3.1. We prove that rk is (1−1/e)-approximate (Lemma 3.3), and convex
(Lemma 3.2). Lemmas 2.3, 2.4 and 3.3, taken together, imply that Algorithm 1 when instantiated with
r = rk, is a (1− 1/e)-approximate MIDR allocation rule. Lemma 3.2 reduces implementing this allocation
rule to solving a convex program.
In Appendix A, we handle the technical and numerical issues related to solving convex programs. First,
we prove that our instantiation of Algorithm 1 can be implemented in expected polynomial-time using the
ellipsoid method under a simplifying assumption on the numerical conditioning of our convex program
(Lemma A.2). Then we show in Section A.3 that the previous assumption can be removed by slightly
modifying our algorithm.
Finally, we prove that truth-telling VCG payments can be computed efficiently in Lemma B.4. Taken
together, these lemmas complete the proof of Theorem 3.1.
3.1 The k-Bounded-Lottery Rounding Scheme
We devise a rounding scheme rk that we term the k-bounded-lottery rounding scheme. Given a feasible
solution x to linear program (2), we let distribution rk(x) be the k-bounded-lottery with marginals x/k (and
promise ∅), as defined in Section 2.4. We make this more explicit in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 The k-Bounded-Lottery Rounding Scheme rk
Input: Fractional solution x ∈ Rm with∑j xj ≤ k, and 0 ≤ xj ≤ 1 for all j.
Output: S ⊆ [m] with |S| ≤ k
1: For each j ∈ [m] designate the interval Ij = [ 1k
∑
j′<j xj′ ,
1
k
∑
j′≤j xj′ ] of length
xj
k
2: Draw p1, . . . , pk independently and uniformly from [0, 1]
3: Let S = {j ∈ [m] : {p1, . . . , pk} ∩ Ij 6= ∅}
The k-bounded-lottery rounding scheme is (1−1/e) approximate and convex. We prove the approxima-
tion lemma below. As for convexity, we present a simplified proof for the special case of coverage valuations
in Section 3.2, and present the proof for MRS valuations in Section 3.3.
Lemma 3.2. The k-bounded-lottery rounding scheme is convex for CPP with MRS valuations.
Lemma 3.3. The k-bounded-lottery rounding scheme is (1 − 1/e)-approximate when valuations are sub-
modular.
Proof. Fix n,m, k and {vi}ni=1. Let S ⊆ [m] be a feasible solution to CPP — i.e. |S| ≤ k. Let 1S be
the vector with 1 in indices corresponding to S, and 0 otherwise. Let T ∼ rk(1S). We will first show that
each element of j ∈ S is included in T with probability at least 1 − 1/e. Observe that T is the union of
k independent draws from a distribution on [m] ∪ {∗}, where each time the probability of j ∈ S is 1/k.
Therefore, the probability that j is included in T is 1− (1− 1/k)k ≥ 1− 1/e.
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Submodularity now implies that E[vi(T )] ≥ (1 − 1/e) · vi(S) for each player i — this was proved in
many contexts: see for example [19, Lemma 2.2], and the earlier related result in [18, Proposition 2.3]. This
completes the proof.
3.2 Warmup: Convexity for Coverage Valuations
In this section, we prove a special case of Lemma 3.2 for coverage valuations. Recall that a coverage function
f on ground set [m] designates some set Y , and m subsets A1, . . . , Am ⊆ Y , such that f(S) = | ∪j∈S Aj |.
Fix n,m, k and {vi}ni=1. Assume that, for each player i, the valuation function vi : 2[m] → R is a
coverage function. We let v(S) =
∑
i vi(S) be the welfare of a solution S to CPP. It is an easy observation
that the sum of coverage functions is also a coverage function. Therefore v(S) is a coverage function. We
let Y be a set, and A1, . . . , Am ⊆ Y , such that v(S) = | ∪j∈S Aj |. While our proof extends easily to the
case where Y is an arbitrary measure space, we assume in this section that Y is a finite set for simplicity.
LetP denote the polytope of fractional solutions to CPP as given in (2). We now show that ES∼rk(x)[v(S)]
is a concave function of x for x ∈ P, completing the proof of Lemma 3.2 for the special case of coverage
valuations. Take an arbitrary x ∈ P, and let S ∼ rk(x) be a random variable. Using linearity of expecta-
tions, we can rewrite the expected welfare as follows.
E[v(S)] = E[| ∪j∈S Aj|] =
∑
ℓ∈Y
Pr[ℓ ∈ ∪j∈SAj ]
Since the sum of concave functions is concave, showing that Pr[ℓ ∈ ∪j∈SAj ] is concave in x for each ℓ ∈ Y
suffices to complete the proof. For ℓ ∈ Y , let Tℓ = {j ∈ [m] : ℓ ∈ Aj} be the set of projects that “cover”
ℓ. Let p1, . . . , pk and I1, . . . , Ik be as in Algorithm 2. Note that {Ij}mj=1 are disjoint sub-intervals of [0, 1],
and |Ij | = xjk . We can rewrite the probability of covering ℓ as follows.
Pr[ℓ ∈ ∪j∈SAj ] = Pr[S ∩ Tℓ 6= ∅]
= Pr[{p1, . . . , pk} ∩ ∪j∈TℓIj 6= ∅]
= 1−Pr[{p1, . . . , pk} ∩ ∪j∈TℓIj = ∅]
= 1−
k∏
t=1
Pr[pt /∈ ∪j∈TℓIj]
= 1−
k∏
t=1
(1− | ∪j∈Tℓ Ij |)
= 1−
(
1−
∑
j∈Tℓ
xj
k
)k
.
The final form is simply the composition of the concave function g(y) = 1 − (1 − y/k)k with the affine
function y →∑j∈Tℓ xj . It is well known that composing a concave function with an affine function yields
another concave function (see e.g. [2]). This completes the proof.
3.3 Convexity for Matroid Rank Sum Valuations
In this section, we will prove Lemma 3.2 in its full generality. First, we recall the discrete hessian matrix,
as defined in [17].
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Definition 3.4 ([17]). Let v : 2[m] → R be a set function. For S ⊆ [m], we define the discrete Hessian
matrix HvS ∈ Rm×m of v at S as follows:
HvS(i, j) = v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S ∪ {i})− v(S ∪ {j}) + v(S) (3)
for i, j ∈ [m].
It was shown in [17] that the discrete hessian matrices are negative semi-definite for matroid rank sum
functions.
Claim 3.5 ([17]). If v : 2[m] → R+ is a matroid rank sum function, then HvS is negative semi-definite for
each S ⊆ [m].
We now return to Lemma 3.2. Fix n and m. For each cardinality bound k ∈ [m], let Pk denote the
polytope of fractional solutions to CPP as given in (2). For a set of MRS valuations v1, . . . , vn, we observe
that the social welfare v(S) =
∑n
i=1 vi(S) is — by the (obvious) fact that the sum of MRS functions is an
MRS function — also an MRS function. Therefore, we will prove Lemma 3.2 by showing that, for each
k ∈ [m] and MRS function v : 2[m] → R, the following function of x ∈ Pk is concave in x.
Gvk(x) = E
S∼rk(x)
[v(S)]
=
∑
S⊆[m]
v(S)Pr[rk(x) = S]
(4)
We use techniques from combinatorics to write Pr[rk(x) = S] in a form that will be easier to work
with. For T ⊆ [m], we use xT as short-hand for
∑
j∈T xj , and T as short-hand for [m] \ T .
Claim 3.6. For each k ∈ [m], x ∈ Pk, and S ⊆ [m]
Pr[rk(x) = S] = −1|S|
∑
R⊆S
−1|R|
(
1− xR
k
)k
(5)
Proof. It is easy to see that Pr[rk(x) = S] is equal to:
Pr[rk(x) ⊆ S]−Pr[
∨
j∈S
rk(x) ⊆ S \ {j}] (6)
Using the inclusion-exclusion principle, we can rewrite (6) as follows:
Pr[rk(x) ⊆ S]−
∑
∅6=T⊆S
−1|T |−1Pr[rk(x) ⊆ S \ T ] (7)
Letting R = S \ T in (7), we get
Pr[rk(x) ⊆ S]−
∑
R(S
−1|S|−|R|−1Pr[rk(x) ⊆ R] (8)
We can easily simplify (8) to conclude that
Pr[rk(x) = S] =
∑
R⊆S
−1|S|−|R|Pr[rk(x) ⊆ R] (9)
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Next, we observe that the expression Pr[rk(x) ⊆ R] can be expressed as a simple closed form in x.
Let p1, . . . , pk and I1, . . . , Im be as in Algorithm 2. The event rk(x) ⊆ R occurs exactly when none of
p1, . . . , pk land in the intervals corresponding to projects R. Recalling that the interval Ij of project j has
length xj/k, we get that the probability of any particular pt falling in ∪j∈RIj is exactly xR/k. Therefore,
by the independence of the variables p1, . . . , pk, we get that
Pr[rk(x) ⊆ R] =
(
1− xR
k
)k
(10)
Combining (9) and (10) completes the proof.
Building on Claim 3.6, we now express the Hessian matrix of Gvk as a non-negative weighted sum of
discrete Hessian matrices of v. We note that when x ∈ Pk, it is easy to verify that k−2k · x ∈ Pk−2, and
therefore (11) is well-defined.
Claim 3.7. For each k ∈ [m], x ∈ Pk, and v : 2[m] → R, we have
▽2Gvk(x) =
k − 1
k
∑
S⊆[m]
Pr
[
rk−2
(
k − 2
k
· x
)
= S
]
HvS (11)
Proof. Fix i, j ∈ [m], possibly with i = j. We work with Gvk as defined in Equation (4), and plug in
expression (5).
Gvk(x) =
∑
S⊆[m]
v(S) · −1|S|
∑
R⊆S
−1|R|
(
1− xR
k
)k
Differentiating with respect to xi and xj gives:
∂2Gvk(x)
∂xi∂xj
=
k − 1
k
∑
S⊆[m]
v(S) · −1|S|
∑
R⊆S\{i,j}
−1|R|
(
1− xR
k
)k−2
We group the terms by projecting S onto [m] \ {i, j}, and then we simplify the resulting expression.
∂2Gvk(x)
∂xi∂xj
=
k − 1
k
∑
S⊆[m]\{i,j}
−1|S|
∑
R⊆S
−1|R|
(
1− xR
k
)k−2
(v(S) − v(S ∪ {i})− v(S ∪ {j}) + v(S ∪ {i, j}))
=
k − 1
k
∑
S⊆[m]
−1|S|
∑
R⊆S
−1|R|
(
1− xR
k
)k−2
(v(S) − v(S ∪ {i})− v(S ∪ {j}) + v(S ∪ {i, j}))
=
k − 1
k
∑
S⊆[m]
−1|S|
∑
R⊆S
−1|R|
(
1− xR
k
)k−2
HvS(i, j) (12)
The second equality follows from the fact that v(S)− v(S ∪ {i})− v(S ∪ {j}) + v(S ∪ {i, j}) = 0 when
S includes either of i and j. The last equality follows by definition of HvS .
Invoking Claim 3.6 with k′ = k − 2 and x′ = k−2k · x, and plugging the resulting expression into into
(12), we conclude that
∂2Gvk(x)
∂xi∂xj
=
k − 1
k
∑
S⊆[m]
Pr
[
rk−2
(
k − 2
k
· x
)
= S
]
HvS(i, j).
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Claims (3.5) and (3.7) establish that, when v is MRS and k ∈ [m], ▽2Gvk(x) is a non-negative weighted
sum of negative semi-definite matrices for each x ∈ Pk. A non-negative weighted sum of negative semi-
definite matrices is negative semi-definite. Therefore, the Hessian matrix of Gvk is negative semi-definite at
each x ∈ Pk, and we conclude that Gvk is a concave function on Pk. This completes the proof of Lemma
3.2.
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A Solving The Convex Program
In this section, we overcome some technical difficulties related to the solvability of convex programs. We
follow the general outline of [17, Appendix B], modifying the proofs throughout in order to handle the
additional technical difficulties specific to CPP. We show in Section A.1 that, in the bounded-lottery-value
oracle model, the four conditions for “solvability” of convex programs, as stated in Fact B.3, are easily
satisfied for convex program (2) when r = rk. However, an additional challenge remains: “solving” a
convex program — as in Definition B.2 — returns an approximately optimal solution. Indeed the optimal
solution of a convex program may be irrational in general, so this is unavoidable.
We show how to overcome this difficulty if we settle for polynomial runtime in expectation. While
the optimal solution x∗ of (2) cannot be computed explicitly, the random variable rk(x∗) can be sampled
in expected polynomial-time. The key idea is the following: sampling the random variable rk(x∗) rarely
requires precise knowledge of x∗. Depending on the coin flips of rk, we decide how accurately we need
to solve convex program (2) in order compute rk(x∗). Roughly speaking, we show that the probability of
requiring a (1 − ǫ)-approximation falls exponentially in 1ǫ . As a result, we can sample rk(x∗) in expected
polynomial-time. We implement this plan in Section A.2 under the simplifying assumption that convex
program (2) is well-conditioned — i.e. is “sufficiently concave” everywhere. In Section A.3, we show how
to remove that assumption by slightly modifying our algorithm.
A.1 Approximating the Convex Program
Claim A.1. There is an algorithm for Combinatorial Public Projects with MRS valuations in the bounded-
lottery-value oracle model that takes as input an instance of the problem and an approximation parameter
ǫ > 0, runs in poly(n,m, log(1/ǫ)) time, and returns a (1− ǫ)-approximate solution to convex program (2)
when r = rk.
It suffices to show that the four conditions of Fact B.3 are satisfied in our setting. The first three are
immediate from elementary combinatorial optimization (see for example [29]). It remains to show that the
first-order oracle, as defined in Fact B.3, can be implemented in polynomial-time in the bounded-lottery-
value oracle model. We let f(x) denote the objective function of convex program (2) when r = rk. This
objective can, by definition, be written as follows.
f(x) = E
S∼rk(x)
[∑
i
vi(S)
]
=
∑
i
Gvik (x)
where vi is the valuation function of player i and Gvik is as defined in (4). By definition, Gvik (x) is the
outcome of querying the bounded-lottery-value oracle of vi with bound k and marginals x/k. Therefore, we
can evaluate f(x) using n bounded-lottery-value queries, one for each player. It remains to show that we
can also evaluate the (multi-variate) derivative ▽f(x) of f(x). Using definition (4) and Claim 3.6, we take
the partial derivative of Gvik with respect to xj and simplify the resulting expression.
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∂Gvik
∂xj
(x) =
∑
S⊆[m]
−1|S|vi(S)
∑
R⊆S\{j}
−1|R|+1
(
1− xR
k
)k−1
=
∑
S⊆[m]\{j}
−1|S| (vi(S ∪ {j})− vi(S))
∑
R⊆S
−1|R|
(
1− xR
k
)k−1
=
∑
S⊆[m]
−1|S| (vi(S ∪ {j})− vi(S))
∑
R⊆S
−1|R|
(
1− xR
k
)k−1
=
∑
S⊆[m]
vi(S ∪ {j})Pr
[
rk−1
(
k − 1
k
x
)
= S
]
−
∑
S⊆[m]
vi(S)Pr
[
rk−1
(
k − 1
k
x
)
= S
]
.
(13)
The second equality follows by grouping the terms of the summation by the projection of S onto [m] \ {j}.
The third equality follows from the observation that v(S ∪ {j})− v(S) = 0 when S includes j. The fourth
equality follows by a simple re-arrangement and application of Claim 3.6.
Inspect the final form (13) in light of the definition of bounded-lottery-value oracles (Definition 2.2) and
the definition of rk (Section 3.1). Notice that the first term is the expected value of vi over the (k − 1)-
bounded-lottery with marginals k−1k x and promise {j}. The second term is the expected value of vi over the
same lottery without the promise. Therefore, we can evaluate ∂G
vi
k
∂xj
(x) using two queries to the bounded-
lottery-value oracle of player i. This completes the proof of Claim A.1.
A.2 The Well-Conditioned Case
In this section, we make the following simplifying assumption: The objective function f(x) of convex
program (2) with r = rk, when restricted to any line in the feasible set P, has a second derivative of
magnitude at least λ =
∑n
i=1 vi([m])
2poly(n,m)
everywhere, where the polynomial in the denominator may be arbitrary.
This is equivalent to requiring that every eigenvalue of the Hessian matrix of f(x) has magnitude at least λ
when evaluated at any point in P. Under this assumption, we prove Lemma A.2.
Lemma A.2. Assume the magnitude of the second derivative of f(x) is at least λ =
∑n
i=1 vi([m])
2poly(n,m)
everywhere.
Algorithm 1, instantiated with r = rk, can be simulated in time polynomial in n and m in expectation.
Let x∗ be the optimal solution to convex program (2) with r = rk. Algorithm 1 outputs a set of projects
distributed as rk(x∗). The k-bounded-lottery rounding scheme, as described in Algorithm 2, requires mak-
ing k independent decisions: for ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we draw pℓ uniformly from [0, 1] and decide which interval
Ij , if any, pℓ falls into. In other words, we find the minimum index jℓ (if any) such that
∑
j≤jℓ
x∗j/k ≥ pℓ.
Fix ℓ. For most realizations of pℓ, we can calculate jℓ using only coarse estimates x˜j to x∗j . Assume we have
an estimation oracle for x∗ that, on input δ, returns a δ-estimate x˜ of x∗: Specifically, x˜j − x∗j ≤ δ for each
j ∈ [m]. If pℓ falls outside the “uncertainty zones” of x˜, such as when |pℓ−
∑
j′≤j x˜j′/k| > δm/k for each
j ∈ [m], it is easy to see that we can correctly determine jℓ by using x˜ in lieu of x. The total measure of
the uncertainty zones of x˜ is at most 2m2δ, therefore pℓ lands outside the uncertainty zones with probability
at least 1 − 2m2δ. The following claim shows that if the estimation oracle for x∗ can be implemented in
time polynomial in log(1/δ), then we can simulate the k-bounded-lottery rounding procedure in expected
polynomial-time.
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Claim A.3. Let x∗ be the optimal solution of convex program (2) with r = rk. Assume access to a subroutine
B(δ) that returns a δ-estimate of x∗ in poly(n,m, log(1/δ)) time. Algorithm 1, instantiated with r = rk,
can be simulated in expected poly(n,m) time.
Proof. Fix ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Draw pℓ ∈ [0, 1] uniformly at random as in the k-bounded-lottery rounding
scheme in Algorithm 2. We will show how to find, in expected poly(n,m) time, the minimum index jℓ (if
any) such that ∑j≤jℓ x∗j/k ≥ pℓ.
The algorithm proceeds as follows: Start with δ = δ0 = 12m2 . Let x˜ = B(δ). While |pℓ−
∑
j′≤j x˜j′/k| ≤
δm/k for some j ∈ [m] (i.e. pℓ may fall inside an “uncertainty zone”) do the following: let δ = δ/2,
x˜ = B(δ) and repeat. After the loop terminates, we have a sufficiently accurate estimate of x∗ to calculate
jℓ.
It is easy to see that the above procedure is a faithful simulation of Algorithm (2) on x∗. It remains
to bound its expected running time. Let δt = 12t+1m2 denote the value of δ at iteration t. By our initial
assumption, iteration t takes poly(n,m, log(1/δt)) = poly(n,m, log(2t+1m2)) = poly(n,m, t) time. The
probability this procedure does not terminate after t iterations is at most 2m2δt = 1/2t. Taken together,
these two facts and a simple geometric summation imply that the expected runtime is polynomial in n and
m.
It remains to show that the estimation oracle B(δ) can be implemented in poly(n,m, log(1/δ)) time.
At first blush, one may expect that the ellipsoid method can be used in the usual manner here. However,
there is one complication: we require an estimate x˜ that is close to x∗ in solution space rather than in terms
of objective value. Using our assumption on the curvature of f(x), we will reduce finding a δ-estimate of
x∗ to finding an 1− ǫ(δ) approximate solution to convex program (2) with r = rk. The dependence of ǫ on
δ will be such that ǫ ≥ poly(δ)/2poly(n,m), thereby we can invoke Claim A.1 to deduce that B(δ) can be
implemented in poly(n,m, log(1/δ)) time.
Let ǫ = ǫ(δ) = δ2λ2∑i vi([m]) . Plugging in the definition of λ, we deduce that ǫ ≥ δ
2/2poly(n,m), which is
the desired dependence. It remains to show that if x˜ is (1 − ǫ)-approximate solution to (2), then x˜ is also a
δ-estimate of x∗.
Using the fact that f(x) is concave, and moreover its second derivative has magnitude at least λ, it a
simple exercise to bound distance of any point x from the optimal point x∗ in terms of its sub-optimality
f(x∗)− f(x), as follows:
f(x∗)− f(x) ≥ λ
2
||x− x∗||2. (14)
Assume x˜ is a (1− ǫ)-approximate solution to (2) with r = rk. Equation (14) implies that
||x˜− x∗||2 ≤ 2
λ
ǫf(x∗) =
δ2∑
i vi([m])
f(x∗) ≤ δ2,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that
∑
i vi([m]) is an upper-bound on the optimal value f(x∗).
Therefore, ||x− x∗|| ≤ δ, as needed. This completes the proof of Lemma A.2.
A.3 Guaranteeing Good Conditioning
In this section, we propose a modification r+k of the k-bounded-lottery rounding scheme rk. We will argue
that r+k satisfies all the properties of rk established so far, with one exception: the approximation guarantee
of Lemma 3.3 is reduced to 1− 1/e− 2−2mn. Then we will show that r+k satisfies the curvature assumption
of Lemma A.2, demonstrating that said assumption may be removed. Therefore Algorithm 1, instantiated
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with r = r+k for combinatorial public projects with MRS valuations in the bounded-lottery-value oracle
model, is (1 − 1/e − 2−2mn) approximate and can be implemented in expected poly(n,m) time. Finally,
we show in Remark A.4 how to recover the 2−2mn term to get a clean 1 − 1/e approximation ratio, as
claimed in Theorem 3.1.
Let µ = 2−2nm. We define r+k in Algorithm 3. Intuitively, r
+
k first chooses a tentative set S ⊆ [m] of
projects using rk. Then it cancels its choice with small probability µ. Finally, with probability β it chooses
a random project j∗ ∈ [m] and lets S = {j∗}. β is defined as the fraction of projects included in the original
tentative choice of S. The motivation behind this seemingly bizarre definition of r+k is purely technical: as
we will see, it can be thought of as adding “concave noise” to rk.
Algorithm 3 Modified k-bounded-lottery Rounding Scheme r+k
Input: Fractional solution x ∈ Rm with∑j xj ≤ k, and 0 ≤ xj ≤ 1 for all j.
Output: Feasible solution S ⊆ [m] with |S| ≤ k
1: Let S = rk(x)
2: Let β = |S|m
3: Draw q1 ∈ [0, 1] uniformly
4: if q1 ∈ [0, µ] then
5: Let S = ∅
6: Draw q2 ∈ [0, 1] uniformly
7: if q2 ∈ [0, β] then
8: Choose project j∗ ∈ [m] uniformly at random.
9: Let S = {j∗}
10: end if
11: end if
We can write the expected welfare ES∼r+
k
(x)[
∑
i vi(S)] as follows.
E
S∼rk(x)
[
(1− µ)
∑
i
vi(S) + µβ
∑
i
vi(j
∗)
]
.
Using linearity of expectations and the fact that β is independent of the choice of j∗ to simplify the expres-
sion, we get that ES∼r+
k
(x)[
∑
i vi(S)] is equal to
(1− µ) E
S∼rk(x)
[∑
i
vi(S)
]
+ µE[β]
∑m
j=1
∑n
i=1 vi({j})
m
.
Observe that rk chooses a project j with probability 1− (1− xj/k)k . Therefore, the expectation of β is∑
j 1−(1−xj/k)
k
m . This gives:
E
S∼r+
k
(x)
[∑
i
vi(S)
]
= (1− µ) E
S∼rk(x)
[∑
i
vi(S)
]
+
µ
m2
 m∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
vi({j})
 m∑
j=1
1− (1− xj/k)k
 .
(15)
It is clear that the expected welfare when using r = r+k is within 1 − µ = 1 − 2−2nm of the expected
welfare when using r = rk in the instantiation of Algorithm 1. Using Lemma 3.3, we conclude that r+k is
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a (1 − 1/e − 2−2nm)-approximate rounding scheme. Moreover, using Lemma 3.2, as well as the fact that
1 − (1 − xj/k)k is a concave function, we conclude that r+k is a convex rounding scheme. Therefore, this
establishes the analogues of Lemmas 3.3 and 3.2 for r+k . It is elementary to verify that our proof of Lemma
A.2 can be adapted to r+k as well.
It remains to show that r+k is “sufficiently concave”. This would establish that the conditioning assump-
tion of Section A.2 is unnecessary for r+k . We will show that expression (15) is a concave function with
curvature of magnitude at least λ =
∑n
i=1 vi([m])
em222nm
everywhere. Since the curvature of concave functions is
always non-positive, and moreover the curvature of the sum of two functions is the sum of their curvatures,
it suffices to show that the second term of the sum (15) has curvature of magnitude at least λ. We note that
the curvature of
∑
j
(
1− (1− xj/k)k
)
is at least e−1 over x ∈ [0, 1]m. Therefore, the curvature of the
second term of (15) is at least
µ
m2
(∑
i
vi([m])
)
e−1 = λ
as needed.
Remark A.4. In this section, we sacrificed 2−2nm in the approximation ratio in order to guarantee expected
polynomial runtime of our algorithm even when convex program (2) is not well-conditioned. This loss can be
recovered to get a clean 1−1/e approximation as follows. Given our (1−1/e−2−2nm)-approximate MIDR
algorithm A, construct the following algorithm A′: Given an instance of combinatorial public projects,
A′ runs A on the instance with probability 1 − e2−2nm, and with the remaining probability solves the
instance optimally in exponential time O(22nm). It was shown in [15] that a random composition of MIDR
mechanisms is MIDR, therefore A′ is MIDR. The expected runtime of A′ is bounded by the expected runtime
of A plus e2−2nm ·O(22nm) = O(1). Finally, the expected approximation of A′ is the weighted average of
the approximation ratio of A and the optimal approximation ratio 1, and is at least (1−e2−2nm)(1−1/e−
2−2nm) + e2−2nm ≥ 1− 1/e.
B Additional Preliminaries
B.1 Matroid Theory
In this section, we review some basics of matroid theory. For a more comprehensive reference, we refer the
reader to [26].
A matroid M is a pair (X ,I), where X is a finite ground set, and I is a non-empty family of subsets of
X satisfying the following two properties. (1) Downward closure: If S belongs to I , then so do all subsets
of S. (2) The Exchange Property: Whenever T, S ∈ I with |T | < |S|, there is some x ∈ S \ T such that
T ∪ {x} ∈ I . Elements of I are often referred to as the independent sets of the matroid. Subsets of X that
are not in I are often called dependent.
We associate with matroid M a set function rankM : 2X → N, known as the rank function ofM , defined
as follows: rankM (A) = maxS∈I |S∩A|. Equivalently, the rank of set A in matroid M is the maximum size
of an independent set contained in A. A set function f on a ground set X is a matroid rank function if there
exists a matroid M on the same ground set such that f = rankM . Matroid rank functions are monotone
(f(S) ≤ f(T ) when S ⊆ T ), normalized (f(∅) = 0), and submodular (f(S)+f(T ) ≥ f(S∩T )+f(S∪T )
for all S and T ).
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B.2 Convex Optimization
In this section, we distill some basics of convex optimization. For more details, see [1].
Definition B.1. A maximization problem is given by a set Π of instances (P, c), where P is a subset of
some euclidean space, c : P → R, and the goal is to maximize c(x) over x ∈ P. We say Π is a convex
maximization problem if for every (P, c) ∈ Π, P is a compact convex set, and c : P → R is concave. If
c : P → R+ for every instance of Π, we say Π is non-negative.
Definition B.2. We say a non-negative maximization problem Π is R-solvable in polynomial time if there
is an algorithm that takes as input the representation of an instance I = (P, c) ∈ Π — where we use
|I| to denote the number of bits in the representation — and an approximation parameter ǫ, and in time
poly(|I|, log(1/ǫ)) outputs x ∈ P such that c(x) ≥ (1− ǫ)maxy∈P c(y).
Fact B.3. Consider a non-negative convex maximization problem Π. If the following are satisfied, then Π is
R-solvable in polynomial time using the ellipsoid method. We let I = (P, c) denote an instance of Π, and
let m denote the dimension of the ambient euclidean space.
1. Polynomial Dimension: m is polynomial in |I|.
2. Starting ellipsoid: There is an algorithm that computes, in time poly(|I|), a point c ∈ Rm, a matrix
A ∈ Rm×m, and a number V ∈ R such that the following hold. We use E(c,A) to denote the ellipsoid
given by center c and linear transformation A.
(a) E(c,A) ⊇ P
(b) V ≤ volume(P)
(c) volume(E(c,A))V ≤ 2poly(|I|)
3. Separation oracle for P: There is an algorithm that takes takes input I and x ∈ Rm, and in time
poly(|I|, |x|) where |x| denotes the size of the representation of x, outputs “yes” if x ∈ P, otherwise
outputs h ∈ Rm such that hTx < hT y for every y ∈ P.
4. First order oracle for c: There is an algorithm that takes input I and x ∈ Rm, and in time poly(|I|, |x|)
outputs c(x) ∈ R and ▽c(x) ∈ Rm.
B.3 Computing Payments
Lemma B.4. Let A be an MIDR allocation rule for combinatorial public projects, and let v1, . . . , vn be
input valuations. Assume black-box access to A, and value oracle access to {vi}ni=1. We can compute, with
poly(n) over-head in runtime, payments p1, . . . , pn such that E[pi] equals the VCG payment of player i for
MIDR allocation rule A on input v1, . . . , vn.
We note that an essentially identical lemma was proved in [17]. Nevertheless, we include a proof for
completeness.
Proof. Without loss of generality, it suffices to show how to compute p1. Let 0 : 2[m] → R be the valuation
evaluating to 0 at each bundle. Recall (see e.g. [22]) that the VCG payment of player 1 is equal to
E
T∼A(0,v2,...,vn)
[
n∑
i=2
vi(T )
]
− E
S∼A(v1,...,vn)
[
n∑
i=2
vi(S)
]
. (16)
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Let S be a sample from A(v1, . . . , vn), and let T be a sample from A(0, v2, . . . , vn). Let p1 =∑n
i=2 vi(T ) −
∑n
i=2 vi(S). Using linearity of expectations, it is easy to see that the expectation of p1 is
equal to the expression in (16). This completes the proof.
We note that the mechanism resulting from Lemma B.4 is individually rational in expectation, and each
payment is non-negative in expectation. We leave open the question of whether it is possible to enforce
individual rationality and non-negative payments for our mechanism ex-post.
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